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Abstract:
Recessions appear to coincide with an increasingly stigmatising presentation of poverty
in parts of the media. Previous research on the connection between high unemployment
andmedia discourse has often relied on case studies of periodswhen stigmatising rhetoric
about the poorwas increasing. We build on earlierwork on how economic context affects
media representations of poverty by creating a unique dataset that measures how often
stigmatising descriptions of the poor are used in five centrist and right-wingBritish news-
papers between 1896 and 2000. Our results suggest stigmatising rhetoric about the poor
increases when unemployment rises, except at the peak of very deep recessions (e.g. the
1930s and 1980s). This pattern is consistent with the idea that newspapers deploy deeply
embedded Malthusian explanations for poverty when those ideas resonate with the eco-
nomic context, and so this stigmatising rhetoric of recessions is likely to recur during
future economic crises.
IǇǍǋǈƽǎƼǍǂǈǇ
The global financial crisis of 2008 seemed to coincide with a rise in stigmatising rhetoric about
people in poverty and welfare recipients across a range of print and television media outlets
(Harkins and Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Tyler, 2008, 2013). This language legitimised welfare re-
trenchment by ‘othering’ (Lister, 2015) people in poverty and representing them as part of an
out-groupwhowere lazy, immoral, and living fraudulently at the expense of hard-working tax-
payers ( Jensen, 2014). Anti-welfare narratives permeated public discourse over this period and
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in some cases even had a demonstrable impact on attitudes toward welfare recipients (Reeves
and de Vries, 2016).
This latest crisis is one recent example of how parts of the media stigmatise the poor during
periods of rising unemployment. A number of studies have argued that media rhetoric about
the poor responds to macroeconomic conditions, becomingmore stigmatising when times are
hard (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Macnicol, 1987). However, the existing quantitative ev-
idence linking economic crises and newspaper rhetoric about the poor remains limited. Ex-
isting work relies on time-consuming hand-coding (Gilens, 1996; Misra et al., 2003), which
limits the ability of researchers to examine long term trends in the language newspapers use
to describe the poor. We know of no quantitative studies that investigate whether the preva-
lence of stigmatising language about the poor is affected by underlying economic conditions.1
Case studies have generated crucial insights into how the print media frame poverty during
economic downturns and periods of high unemployment but they have done so by examining
precisely those periods in which stigmatising rhetoric increased. This logic of case selection
may inadvertently overlook periods when, for example, unemployment rises but there is no
change in stigmatising rhetoric (Deacon, 1976).
We address this gap in research on the link between economic crises and newspaper rhetoric
about poverty by drawing on a unique dataset measuring how often five right-wing and cen-
trist British newspapers and periodicals use stigmatising language about people in poverty
throughout the twentieth century (1896-2000). We find that stigmatising rhetoric about the
poor becomes more common when unemployment increases, but this association weakens
when unemployment rates are especially high (>10%), such as during the 1930s and the 1980s.
Outside these exceptional periods, we conclude that British centrist and right-wing newspa-
pers deploy deeply embeddedMalthusian anxieties about the behaviour of the poor when un-
employment is rising. In doing so they draw on a powerful set of ideas to explain an economic
phenomenon that by itself might threaten the hegemony of individualistic interpretations of
unemployment and poverty. Adopting an historical perspective reveals how deeply embedded
ideas, such as Malthusian explanations for poverty, are deployed when they resonate with the
structural context. Media stigmatisation of the poor following the global financial crisis was
consistent with how our sample of newspapers responded to changing economic conditions
across the twentieth century.
RƾƼǒƼǅǂǇǀMƺǅǍǁǎǌ: ǆƾƽǂƺ ǋƾǌǉǈǇǌƾǌ ǍǈǁǂǀǁǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ ǂǇǁǂǌ-
ǍǈǋǂƼƺǅ ƼǈǇǍƾǑǍ
While themedia reaction to the global financial crisis in theUK intensified anti-welfare rhetoric
( Jensen, 2014; Jensen and Tyler, 2015), such concerns about the numbers and morality of the
poor and the unemployed are not new, and can be traced back over many centuries (Day, 2001;
1Rose and Baumgartner (2013) use a similar methodology to our own. However, their study of how poverty
is framed in the US covers a substantially shorter time period (48 years vs 105 years in our study), and focuses on
the consequences rather than the determinants of media rhetoric about the poor.
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Welshman, 2007).2 Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population (2008), first pub-
lished in 1798, has had an enormous influence on how poverty is understood in British society
(Golding and Middleton, 1982; Harkins and Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Macnicol, 1998).
Malthus argued that providingwelfare is counterproductive because it breaks the natural check
that starvation places on the numbers of the poor. In his view, the poor would not work if
they are not required to do so to survive, and so providing them with food would erode their
work ethic. Furthermore, their inability to exercise sexual restraint means that their numbers
would inexorably increase, leading to collective immiseration and eventual societal collapse.
When people refuse to work, unemployment rises, and so rising unemployment becomes a
symptom of the moral decay that will make societies unsustainable, unless action is taken to
reducewelfare uptake anddis-incentivisewelfare dependency. To this endMalthus argued that
welfare receipt should be stigmatised: ‘hard as itmay appear in individual instances, dependent
poverty ought to be held disgraceful’ (Malthus, 2008: III.VI.5).
Malthusian ideas have had a profound influence on public and policy discourse for nearly 200
years, shaping the Poor Law debates of the 1830s (Malthus, 2008; Polanyi, 2002), the welfare
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (Somers and Block, 2005), and austerity policies following the
Great Recession (Harkins and Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Jensen and Tyler, 2015).
Malthus’s influence can be clearly seen in media responses to unemployment. Public debates
about poverty during the 1890s and early 1900s – an economically turbulent period when
unemployment fluctuated wildly – were dominated by concerns about the spread of a ‘degen-
erate nature’ among the worst off in society, the ‘social residuum’ or ‘unemployables’ (Welsh-
man, 2007: 2, 21; see also Day, 2001). In 1894, only a year after the peak of a recession, Ge-
offrey Drage (Secretary to the Labour Commission) argued that unemployment was mostly
attributable to ‘faults of character – habits of intemperance, idleness, or dishonesty’ (Drage,
1894: 142).
When the Great Depression hit, parts of the press blamed ‘dole’ abusers for the country’s eco-
nomic difficulties rather than speculators or financiers (Golding andMiddleton, 1982 Deacon,
1976). In August 1931, The Daily Telegraph called on the government to ‘not be moved by the
threatening invective of those who... [cry] ”Hands off our dole”’. The government cut unem-
ployment benefit by 10%.
Between 1973 and 1976, a moral panic about welfare fraud coincided with a doubling of un-
employment rates from 1.9% to 3.9%. On 15 July 1976, the Daily Express’ front page read ‘Get
the Scroungers!’ This war on benefits cheats was widespread enough that around 30% of all
social policy-related news stories in 1976 were concerned with welfare abuse. Such stigma-
tising rhetoric punctured the thin ‘veneer of an apparent ”welfare consensus”’ that had existed
since WWII (Golding and Middleton, 1982) and legitimised major cuts to public spending.
2Demonisation of the poor in Britain goes back at least as far as the fifteenth century (Golding andMiddleton,
1982). We focus on debates from about 1880 onwards in this paper because our data begins in 1896.
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IƽƾƺǍǂǈǇƺǅ ƾǆƻƾƽƽƾƽǇƾǌǌ ƺǇƽ Ǎǁƾ ǆƾƽǂƺ
These historical episodes make it clear that the print media has repeatedly played a crucial role
in framing recessions in Malthusian terms, raising the question about why journalists recur-
rently deploy this language amidst rising unemployment. Part of the explanation seems to be
that Malthusian ideas have been ‘ideationally embedded’ in the culture of Anglophone coun-
tries: they have become central features of the narratives and explanatory systems that social
actors use to explain the world, often without realising their source (Somers and Block, 2005:
264). The success ofMalthusian explanations of poverty is rooted in the capacity of this theory
tomake itself true by changing the features of theworld that appear salient to people, including
journalists (Bourdieu, 1998: 95). For example, living in a society where Malthusian explana-
tions are central to how people understand poverty means people can now see the perverse
effects of welfare almost everywhere they look. Despite the fact that there are vanishingly few
people who actually refuse to work, the dominance of the Malthusian narrative makes it pos-
sible for people to believe that such behaviour is commonplace (Macdonald et al., 2014). By
‘making themselves true’, Malthusian ideas have become a form of common sense, accepted
across society. So deeply embedded are these narratives in the Anglophone world that even
those in poverty often deploy such images and tropes (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013).
From this perspective, journalists are not the sole creators of stigmatising rhetoric, they are
simply one set of actors who are ‘engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning’ and
who are part of a discourse that renders some kinds of occurrences more meaningful than
others (Benford and Snow, 2000). Like politicians and the general public, journalists deploy
Malthusian ideas because they are engaged in a process of reproducing and recirculatingwidely
accepted ways of understanding the social world (Couldry and Hepp, 2016). Journalists also
possess a high degree of power to shape public opinion and government policy through the
way they deploy these discourses in framing the issues of the day.3 Therefore, it is worth con-
sidering how journalists’ relationship to their readers, and the economic context, may make
them more or less likely to draw on Malthusian explanations for poverty.
Wǁǒ Ǉƾǐǌǉƺǉƾǋǌ ǎǌƾ MƺǅǍǁǎǌǂƺǇ ǂƽƾƺǌ ǂǇ ǋƾƼƾǌǌǂǈǇǌ
Whatever their goal or agenda, journalists need to effectively communicate with their readers.
To do so, journalists draw on evocative and recognisable tropes, metaphors, or images. As de-
scribed above, Malthusian ideas provide a rich and compelling set of narratives journalists can
use to frame their explanations of social phenomena (Gamson and Lasch, 1983;McKendrick et
al., 2008).4 Malthusian ideas will not be ever-present inmedia discourse, rather, journalists are
more likely to deploy them when they resonate most strongly with readers’ experiences and
the broader context (Benford and Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992). Rising unemployment is a set
of circumstances that Malthusian ideas explain well by providing a simple theory whereby an
3For detail about the processes by which individuals draw on media framings to make their minds up about
social and political issues see Gamson (1992).
4This account abstracts from a number of important aspects of media production, such as the role of news-
paper owners or editors. This is not because we believe these aspects are unimportant but rather that they are not
central to argument we are making in this paper. We return to this issue in the discussion.
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increasing population in poverty is a natural result of the immorality of the poor (Somers and
Block, 2005). As a result, when unemployment rates go up, stigmatising rhetoric in the print
media should increase because this is when Malthusian ideas are at their most relevant as a
way of making sense of changing economic conditions. By contrast, when unemployment de-
clines, and the Malthusian explanation of poverty becomes less relevant to the circumstances,
stigmatising rhetoric should decline as well.
This ‘Malthusian’ theory has never been tested quantitatively. Thus it is also possible that when
unemployment is rising it becomes harder to maintain that ‘faults of character’ (Drage, 1894)
are the cause of joblessness, and as a result structural explanations of poverty may resonate
more stronglywith economic context andnewspaper readers’ experiences (vanOorschot, 2006,
Benford and Snow). From this perspective, when unemployment rates go up stigmatising
rhetoric in themedia will decline, reflecting the increased resonance of structural explanations
of poverty.
The central question of this paper is thus whether newspapers use stigmatising rhetoric about
people in povertymore frequentlywhen unemployment rates go up, orwhen they decline. Our
analysis addresses this question by drawing on a novel data set covering the entire twentieth
century, allowing us to connect macroeconomic conditions with how newspapers talk about
people living in poverty.
DƺǍƺ ƺǇƽ ǆƾǍǁǈƽ
SǍǂǀǆƺǍǂǌǂǇǀ ǋǁƾǍǈǋǂƼ ǂǇ Ǉƾǐǌǉƺǉƾǋǌ
We construct a unique data set measuring the frequency of stigmatising language about peo-
ple in poverty over the twentieth century. The Gale NewsVault database contains archives of
five British newspapers from their inception to the present day: The Mail (daily and Sunday
editions), The Telegraph (daily and Sunday editions), The Times (daily and Sunday editions), Fi-
nancial Times, and the Economist. While there is some diversity among these papers in their
political alignment and readership demographics, they are all are predominantly centrist or
right-wing in orientation and are read by a largely middle-class audience (see Web Appendix
1 for further information). Unfortunately, the Gale NewsVault database does not contain any
left-wing newspapers. As a result, we are unable to saywhether left-wing newspapers aremore
likely to use stigmatising language when unemployment increases.
We restrict our sample to 1896-2000, when all five newspapers are available. To calculate the
frequency of stigmatising language about people living in poverty we utilise Gale NewsVault’s
search function. This returns the frequency of articles containing specific terms by year.5
5For evidence that our strategy of counting word usage in newspapers is a valid measure of newspaper cov-
erage of current events see Lansdall-Welfare and colleagues’ (2017) analysis of a database of British newspapers
from 1800-1950.
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Wǈǋƽ ƼǁǈǂƼƾ
Stigmatising language about the poor frames people in poverty asmembers of an outgroup and
associates poverty with negative stereotypes asserting immoral behaviour. The specific lan-
guage used to describe the poor has changed substantially over time; words used frequently in
one period, such as ‘unemployables’ or the ‘residuum’ in the late 19th century, later drop out of
common usage. Political entrepreneurs create new terms, such as the ‘underclass’ in the 1980s,
to express a set of ideas that remains fairly static (Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Welshman, 2007).
We select words following earlier research on how poverty is presented in the media (Day,
2001; Golding and Middleton, 1982; Tyler, 2013; Welshman, 2007), choosing a large number
of words (28) on the assumption that historical idiosyncrasies in usage should average out. Our
set of words includes terms which are used to describe people in poverty in a stigmatising or
demeaning manner such as ‘scrounger’, ‘skiver’, or ‘underclass’ (Golding andMiddleton, 1982).
We also use terms that denote negative attributes that are commonly asserted to be associated
with poverty such as ‘lazy’, ‘feckless’, or ‘unemployable’ (Welshman, 2007). When such terms
are used they invoke negative stereotypes linking povertywith deviant and immoral behaviour,
thus presenting poverty as shameful and othering the poor (Lister, 2015).
Our focus is onmeasuring the prevalence of stigmatising and othering rhetoric about the poor.
We are not trying to measure the net ‘mood’ (balance of positive vs. negative coverage) of print
media discourse about the poor (Rose and Baumgartner, 2013) because apparently positive
words about poverty can be used with a stigmatising intent (consider the negative connota-
tions of the word ‘benefits’ in contemporary political discourse), and the framing of articles
can provoke stigmatising reactions in their readers even if the words they use are generally
neutral (see Gilens, 1996 for evidence of how ostensibly neutral images change perceptions of
welfare recipients).
We use the frequency (the absolute number of uses) of each word rather than a measure of
popularity (the proportionof articles published in a year inwhich a givenword appears), in both
descriptive statistics and the regression models. This is because the total number of articles
fluctuates substantially from year to year (including a drop at the start of WWII because of
paper rationing) and so artificially shifts the relative popularity far more than the absolute
frequency.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our set of words. We include sparklines to show
differences in how often these words are used over the period. Some words are used fairly
consistently, such as ‘tramp’. Others are popular only in the early 20th century, such as ‘de-
serving poor’, while others gain in popularity such as ‘underclass’, which was unused prior to
the late 20th century.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for words measuring stigmatising rhetoric about the poor.
Word Average Min Max Sparkline
Peasant* 948.30 467 2413
Tramp* 659.21 195 1216
Beggar* 332.31 46 1313
Peon* 305.90 46 587
Pauper* 175.58 10 844
Dependency 103.70 14 511
Idler* 85.61 22 202
Lower class 72.03 8 181
Delinquent 62.16 7 272
Loafer* 56.02 4 201
Delinquency 55.58 2 242
Indigent 50.02 2 241
Vagrant 40.94 4 138
Feckless 39.27 0 216
Indolent 30.60 5 85
Unemployable 24.62 0 80
Vagrancy 23.47 0 93
Underclass 22.19 0 225
Deserving poor 22.00 0 153
Shirker* 19.19 1 230
Scrounger* 16.80 0 130
Residuum 10.72 0 52
Skiver* 9.71 0 67
Dependent on benefits 7.86 0 45
Criminal class 7.30 0 19
Workshy 6.64 0 39
Dangerous class 5.20 0 15
Riff raff 1.66 0 20
Notes: Data from Gale Newsvault. Words ordered by descending average frequency. Sparklines
are intended to give a sense of relative frequency of word across time (1896-2000) and should
be read with respect to minimum and maximum for each word.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates and stigmatising rhetoric about the poor in Britain, 1896-2000
Notes: Both vertical axes are on a logarithmic scale.
In figure 1 we plot the average frequency of stigmatising rhetoric against unemployment rates
across the twentieth century, taken from the Bank of England’s ‘Three Centuries of Macroe-
conomic Data’ series (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2016). Across much of the 20th century these
two lines seem to move together, suggesting that as unemployment rises so does stigmatising
rhetoric (r = 0.705), providing some evidence in support of the ‘Malthusian’ hypothesis.
Nƾǐǌǉƺǉƾǋ ǋǁƾǍǈǋǂƼ ƺǇƽǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍǈǏƾǋ Ǎǁƾ ǍǐƾǇ-
ǍǂƾǍǁ ƼƾǇǍǎǋǒ
Unemployment rates are a major driver of hardship for which measures are available cover-
ing the entire twentieth century (unlike measures of poverty, which are not regularly available
until the mid 1960s). Furthermore, the morality and behaviour of the unemployed is central
to how poverty has historically been discussed in the British print media, as the cases studies
cited above indicate. Therefore, we focus on the relationship between unemployment rates
and stigmatising rhetoric to understand how newspaper rhetoric about the poor depends on
levels of poverty and hardship.
Looking more closely there are periods when this relationship does not hold. For example,
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at the beginning of the 1930s there is a sharp rise in unemployment that coincides with a re-
duction in the amount of stigmatising rhetoric. Then as unemployment rates gradually fall
through the middle of the 1930s stigmatising rhetoric rises again. Similarly, during the 1980s
we see this relationship become less clear. As unemployment rates rose between 1979 and
1980, there was a sharp increase in stigmatising rhetoric, but as unemployment continued to
increase throughout the middle of the 1980s, stigmatising rhetoric seemed to decline, before
rising steadily as unemployment fell.
Box 1: Statistical analysis
Our main model is a first difference model:
∆Rhetorict =α + β1∆Unemploymentt + β2∆Articlest + ϵt (1)
Where t is year and ∆ represents annual change. ∆Rhetoric is the annual change in
the logged average number of stigmatising words used by our newspapers in each year,
∆Unemployment is the change in the logged unemployment rate,∆Articles is the change
in the logged number of articles published by these newspapers. α is our constant and ϵ is
the error term. β1 is the coefficient of interest and estimates the association between rising
unemployment and changes in the amount of stigmatising rhetoric. Models 2 to 4 in table
2 add covariates to this basic specification (see Web Appendix 2 for descriptive statistics).
∆Rhetoric, ∆Articles, and ∆Unemployment, are all logged because they have highly
non-normal distributions.
We also test for non-linearity in the relationship between changes in unemployment and
changes in stigmatising rhetoric by including an interaction term between the level of unem-
ployment and changes in the unemployment rate,
∆Rhetorict =α + β1∆Unemploymentt + β2Unemploymentt
+ β3∆Unemployment× Unemploymentt
+ β4∆Articlest + ϵt (2)
Allmodels account for autocorrelation usingNewey-West standard errorswith a second-order
lag. We justify this lag-length in web appendix 3.
Aǋƾ ƼǁƺǇǀƾǌ ǂǇ ǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ ƺǌǌǈƼǂƺǍƾƽ ǐǂǍǁ ƼǁƺǇǀƾǌ ǂǇ ǌǍǂǀǆƺ-
ǍǂǌǂǇǀ ǋǁƾǍǈǋǂƼ?
We further investigate the association between unemployment rates and stigmatising rhetoric
using regression models (full details in Box 1). As our theory suggests, stigmatising rhetoric
should respond to changes in unemployment because journalists and editors are probablymore
responsive to short-term changes in the economy (eg. 2% rise in unemployment) than long-
term structural conditions (eg. lowunemployment over the last 10 years). We estimatewhether
annual changes in unemployment are associated with annual changes in stigmatising rhetoric.
This ‘first difference’ approach reduces the risk of identifying a spurious relationship, espe-
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cially if long-run trends in our key variables are correlated with other macroeconomic or po-
litical variables. We therefore model the response of the print media to changes in economic
conditions rather than the underlying levels, taking into account the total number of articles
published in any given year.
Table 2: Association between unemployment rate and stigmatising rhetoric adjusting for
covariates, 1896-2000
Annual change in the average frequency of
stigmatising words
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Increase in the unemployment 0.058** 0.042* 0.044** 0.033*
rate (log) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Increase in the number of 0.77*** 0.68*** 0.82*** 0.77***
published articles (log) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
Defence spending (%GDP) -0.0047*** -0.0027
(0.00099) (0.0020)
Conservative party (ref)
Labour -0.023 -0.025
(0.020) (0.021)
Coalition -0.014 -0.022
(0.022) (0.029)
Whig/Liberal -0.041 -0.046
(0.027) (0.027)
Increase in public debt -0.000057 0.00063
(%GDP) (0.00062) (0.00093)
Increase in tax revenues -0.0035 -0.0012
(%GDP) (0.0050) (0.0058)
Increase in non-defence government 0.012*** 0.0073
spending (%GDP) (0.0030) (0.0054)
Constant -0.0069 0.0062 -0.0083 0.0076
(0.0085) (0.014) (0.0080) (0.015)
Observations 105 105 100 100
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All models estimated
using Newey-West standard errors which are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
up to the second lag. Descriptive statistics for control variables in Web Appendix 2.
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This analysis provides evidence for the ‘Malthusian’ hypothesis. Rising unemployment is pos-
itively correlated with rising stigmatising rhetoric even after accounting for the number of
articles published in that year (Model 1: Table 2). Other variables may potentially explain this
relationship: in figure 1 unemployment and stigmatising rhetoric both dramatically decline
duringWWI andWWII and so we include government spending on defence (% of GDP) in our
models (Mitchell, 2007), but this does not substantively alter our main finding (Model 2: Table
2). Political factors, such as the party in power, may shape media rhetoric during times of ris-
ing unemployment through their ‘agenda-setting’ capacity (Tyler, 2013). However, we see no
clear change in our results once we control for the political party composition of government
(Model 2: Table 2). See web appendix 4 for evidence that these results are robust to alternative
measures of wartime, and controls for election year.
The health of public finances is another possible confounder: during the Great Recession con-
servative media often blamed welfare recipients for high levels of public sector debt. There-
fore we add measures of public debt, tax revenue, and non-defence public spending, all as a
proportion of GDP, to our models (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2016). The coefficient on unem-
ployment remains positive and statistically significant, although there is some evidence that in-
creased non-defence public spending is associated with increased stigmatising rhetoric. Taken
together, the stability of our regression results offer further evidence in favour of the ‘Malthu-
sian’ hypothesis that stigmatising rhetoric becomes more commonwhen unemployment rises.
Wǁǒ ƽǈƾǌ Ǎǁƾ ǋƾǅƺǍǂǈǇǌǁǂǉ ƻƾǍǐƾƾǇ ǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ ƺǇƽ ǌǍǂǀǆƺǍǂǌ-
ǂǇǀ ǋǁƾǍǈǋǂƼ ǐƾƺǄƾǇ ǂǇ Ǎǁƾ ȢѴѱѵǌ ƺǇƽ ȢѴ8ѵǌ?
Figure 1 shows that the association between unemployment and negative rhetoric breaks down
in periods of especially high unemployment rates, potentially suggesting some non-linearity in
the association between unemployment and stigmatising rhetoric. Stigmatising rhetoric may
not increase with rising unemployment if the starting level of unemployment is already very
high.
To test this we re-estimate model 1 from table 2 with an interaction between the change in
the unemployment rate and the level of unemployment (see Box 1, web appendix 5 for details).
Figure 2 plots the estimated effect of a 1% increase in unemployment on changes in negative
rhetoric, at a variety of different starting levels of unemployment. A 1% increase in unem-
ployment is associated with a greater increase in stigmatising rhetoric when the initial level of
unemployment is low. At higher rates of unemployment the effect of an increase in unemploy-
ment on stigmatising rhetoric gets smaller. At levels of unemployment above 7% the associa-
tion between change in unemployment and stigmatising rhetoric is not significantly different
from 0. In fact, at very high levels of unemployment, an additional increase in unemployment
– for example, from 13% to 14% - may even reduce the amount of stigmatising rhetoric (al-
though the confidence intervals cover 0). This is the situation we see in the early 1930s when
the use of stigmatising rhetoric falls once unemployment rates became exceptionally high.
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Figure 2: Increases in unemployment are associated with increases in stigmatising rhetoric
only when the level of unemployment is low
Notes: We estimate the change in stigmatising rhetoric associated with a 1% increase in unemploy-
ment given the pre-existing level of unemployment. While an unemployment of 0 is strictly outside of
our sample, there are years when unemployment rates are very low ( 0.1%). Model coefficients in web
appendix 5.
Iǌ ǋǂǌǂǇǀ ǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ ƺǌǌǈƼǂƺǍƾƽ ǐǂǍǁ ƼǁƺǇǀƾǌ ǂǇ ǐǈǋƽǌ ǎǇǋƾ-
ǅƺǍƾƽ Ǎǈ ǉǈǏƾǋǍǒ?
It is possible that the association between unemployment and stigmatising rhetoric could be
spurious and driven by some unobserved factor that affects the words newspapers use un-
related to changes in unemployment rates. We explore this possibility by testing whether our
measure of unemployment is correlatedwith a set of placebowords that wewould not theoret-
ically expect to be correlated with changes in unemployment. Using the same data andmethod
described above (see Box 1), we construct a sample of 12 commonly-used words in four cat-
egories: historical figures (Shakespeare, Mozart), past-times (football, cricket, opera, theatre),
countries (France, Germany, America), and rooms of the house (bedroom, bathroom, kitchen).
We hypothesise that changes in the logged frequency of these ‘placebo’ words should not be
associated with changes in logged unemployment rates. If they were, this would raise serious
doubts about our argument. Table 3 replicates models from Table 2 with logged mean fre-
quency of placebo words as the dependent variable. In each model the relationship is positive
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but statistically insignificant. Moreover, the size of the association is far smaller. For example,
in the fully adjustedmodels (models 4 in tables 2 and 3), the coefficient for stigmatising rhetoric
(δstigmatising = 0.033) is 10 times larger than the coefficient for the placebowords (δplacebo =
0.0031). These models increase our confidence that the relationship between unemployment
and stigmatising rhetoric is not spurious.
Table 3: Association between unemployment rate and placebo words adjusting for
covariates, 1896-2000
Annual change in the average frequency of
placebo words
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Increase in the unemployment 0.025 0.020 0.013 0.0031
rate (log) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
Increase in the number of 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.81*** 0.75***
published articles (log) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
Defence spending (%GDP) -0.0018 -0.0027
(0.0012) (0.0018)
Conservative party (ref)
Labour -0.020 -0.022
(0.013) (0.013)
Coalition -0.013 -0.022
(0.017) (0.019)
Whig/Liberal -0.0088 -0.016
(0.016) (0.017)
Increase in public debt (%GDP) 0.00028 0.00096
(0.00042) (0.00061)
Increase in tax revenues (%GDP) -0.0016 0.00076
(0.0027) (0.0029)
Increase in non-defence government 0.0012 -0.0028
spending (%GDP) (0.0020) (0.0030)
Constant 0.0030 0.012 0.0032 0.016
(0.0065) (0.0090) (0.0057) (0.0083)
Observations 105 105 100 100
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All models
estimated using Newey-West standard errors which are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation up to the second lag. Descriptive statistics for control variables in
Web Appendix 2.
13
Aǋƾ ǈǎǋ ǋƾǌǎǅǍǌ ǋǈƻǎǌǍ Ǎǈ ǆƾƺǌǎǋƾǆƾǇǍ ƾǋǋǈǋ?
Measuring stigmatising rhetoric about the poor by counting the number of times particular
words or phrases are usedwill necessarily entail measurement error. In this sectionwe explore
whether and how measurement error may bias our results.
We first investigate whether a few specific words are driving our results by estimating regres-
sion models where the frequency of each individual word is treated as a separate response
variable. Figure 3 presents the association between logged unemployment rates and each of
the 28 words we use to measure stigmatising rhetoric (see table 1).6 Of the thirty-two words
analysed, thirty (94%) have positive associations with unemployment – meaning they are used
more often in years when unemployment is higher. Moreover, the confidence intervals around
the coefficient for logged unemployment do not include zero for twenty-eight of the thirty-two
words (88%). The vast majority of the stigmatising words in our sample are used with higher
frequencies in years with higher levels of unemployment, providing evidence their usage is
driven by a common underlying process.
Frequency ofword use is an imperfectmeasure of stigmatising rhetoric because all of thewords
used in this analysis are polysemic, even if they are primarily recognisable as words associated
with poverty. Ambiguity of meaning creates some uncertainty in our results: perhaps the cor-
relations we observe are driven by uses of words that are unrelated to poverty. To address this
concern, we conduct a content analysis of newspaper articles in years where our regression
model fits well (i.e. typical cases) and years where our model fits poorly (i.e. deviant cases).
Typical case analysis is primarily confirmatory – exploring whether the words and phrases
used in our measure of stigmatising rhetoric are in fact being deployed in a poverty-related
context. Deviant case analysis, however, is particularly good at discovering measurement er-
ror or omitted variables (Seawright, 2016).
We identify two typical (1901 and 1991) and two deviant (1934 and 1980) cases using the ab-
solute value of the residuals frommodel 1 in table 2 and we selected words for further analysis
based on whether they were rising in that year or were unusually elevated in that period. We
also chose a variety ofwords to ensure our results are not driven by idiosyncrasies of any partic-
ular term. In each year, we read the first 100 randomly selected articles or, if there were fewer
than 100 articles, we read every article. The second author then coded each usage of eachword
according to whether the word was used in reference to the poor (if it was not it was classed
as ‘irrelevant’) and if the word was used in reference to the poor we then determined whether
the word was used in a stigmatising, sympathetic, or neutral way. The first author also coded
half of these cases to check intercoder reliability. We provide some illustrative examples of
this coding in table 4. Further details are provided in Web Appendix 6, including statistics on
intercoder reliability.
6Negative binomial models for overdispersed count data are used, with the total number of articles treated
as an exposure variable. Serial correlation is corrected for with Newey-West standard errors, and a linear time
trend included. Note that this analysis examines levels of unemployment and frequency of word usage rather
than changes.
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Figure 3: Association between unemployment and the frequency of stigmatising words or
phrases, 1896-2000
Notes: Each point estimate and 95% confidence interval comes from a different regression model. All
models are negative binomial regressionmodels which adjusts for over-dispersion using the total num-
ber of articles published in a given year. We use Newey-West standard errors to adjust for serial corre-
lation and heteroscedasticity.
Table 4: Examples of newspaper word usage by relevance and sentiment
Stigmatising/Negative Sympathetic/Positive Neutral Irrelevant
‘A family of paupers,
extending to three
generations, has cost
the ratepayers of the
Paddington Union a
sum of £3,000’
(Hereditary Pauperism,
Daily Mail,
21/11/1901)
‘A pathetic letter,
which throws a flood
of light on the terrible
monotony of life in a
workhouse’ (A day in a
Pauper’s Life, Daily
Mail, 29/10/ 1901)
‘Mr How is highly
educated, and spends
most of his time
travelling about the
country, mixing with
tramps and other
outcasts’ (A Pauper
Millionaire, Daily Mail,
9/10/1901)
‘The man found dead
under a hedge… and
since buried in a
pauper’s grave, was
John Howard Bullheid’
(Solicitor’s Strange
Death, Daily Telegraph,
9/10/ 1901)
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‘Gangs of drunken
beggars… aggressive
vagrants’ (Menace of
the beggars who strike
fear in heart of
London, Daily Mail,
17/6/1991)
‘An underclass is
formed by a physical
concentration of social
problems’ (The
Underclass is no
Illusion, Financial
Times, 22/4/1991)
‘His chosen descent
into the underworld of
the workless and
vagrant’ (Making it
seem virtuous to eat
bacon, Daily Telegraph,
19/10/1991)
‘Jimmy finds a vagrant
who has moved in’ (TV
Listing for Casualty,
8/11/1991)
The typical case analysis confirms our main findings, but it also highlights some of the chal-
lenges with this approach to measuring stigmatising rhetoric. Both ‘pauper’ and ‘underclass’
were almost always used in relation to issues of poverty but this was not always true of ‘loafer’
and ‘vagrant’, where around 40% ofmentionswere not directly related to poverty. Importantly,
of the uses of ‘loafer’ and ‘vagrant’ that pertain to poverty, the majority are negative (40%-50%,
compared to 0%-18% that are sympathetic). This suggests that increases in stigmatising words
are a good measure of increasing stigmatising rhetoric, and do not simply capture increasing
discussion of poverty in general at times of high unemployment.
The deviant case analysis brings out a different but equally important perspective. In those
yearswhere ourmodel fits poorly there are a higher number (30%-70%of all uses) of ‘irrelevant’
uses of tramp (e.g., ‘tramp shipping’), beggar (e.g., ‘The Beggar’s Opera’), and workshy (e.g., the
name of a race-horse). These cases fit our model poorly because the words are not being used
to describe the poor at all, confirming the presence of measurement error in our dependent
variable (Seawright, 2016).
Our content analysis of typical and deviant cases provides additional evidence supporting
the ‘Malthusian’ hypothesis that stigmatising rhetoric increases when unemployment rises.
Counting word frequencies is not a perfect strategy for measuring negative rhetoric. It clearly
captures both signal (uses of the words in relation to poverty) and noise. The noise that we
measure, however, seems more likely to be random (uses of the words unrelated to poverty)
rather than biasing our results.
DǂǌƼǎǌǌǂǈǇ
This analysis draws on a dataset measuring how often five centrist and right-wing newspapers
used stigmatising language about people in poverty across the twentieth century. Case studies
of media rhetoric have often argued that the poor are stigmatised more by the media during
recessions because the media frame unemployment through a Malthusian lens (Harkins and
Lugo-Ocando, 2016). Consistent with this argument, we find that when unemployment in-
creases so too does the frequency of stigmatising rhetoric about the poor. This association is
not explained by other political, economic, or fiscal variables. Our content analysis of articles
suggest that the words we selected are used in a predominantly stigmatising or negative way
in years where unemployment is increasing.
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Figure 4: Trends in the frequency of stigmatising rhetoric and welfare attitudes in the UK
Notes: Public opinion data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 1987-2000.
SǍǂǀǆƺ ƺǇƽ ƺǍǍǂǍǎƽƾǌ Ǎǈǐƺǋƽ ǉƾǈǉǅƾ ǈǇ ƻƾǇƾƿǂǍǌ
One possible consequence of the recurrent stigmatisation of the poor is its effect on public
attitudes toward people in poverty and welfare recipients. Media framings have a great deal
of power to ‘construct’ and ‘normalise’ certain ways of viewing poverty (Gamson et al., 1992).
Unfortunately, data on public opinion towardwelfare is too sparse before the 1980s to system-
atically investigate whether shifts in media rhetoric influenced attitudes (Hudson et al., 2016).
Looking just at attitudinal shifts towards welfare recipients since the start of the British Social
Attitudes Survey (covering 1987-2000), we find increasing stigmatising rhetoric about welfare
recipients in the media during the late-1980s and 1990s appears to have preceded increas-
ingly negative social attitudes (figure 4). This trend is consistent with a wide body of empirical
evidence documenting the effect of the media on attitudes (King et al., 2017) and political out-
comes, like voting (Reeves et al., 2016).
CƺǎǌƺǅǂǍǒ, ǆƾƼǁƺǇǂǌǆǌ, ƺǇƽ ǆƾƽǂƺ ǉǋǈƽǎƼǍǂǈǇ
The temporal reach of our analysis allows us to avoid relying on case studies of specific periods
when media stigmatisation of the poor was highly salient. Our modelling attempts to address
both long-term confounding through first differencing, and short-term confounding through
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our control variables- a strategy which is reinforced by our placebo analyses. However, we
are still cautious about a causal interpretation of our results, in part because of the usual diffi-
culties involved in causal inference from observational data, but also because the account we
provide does not fully specify or test themechanisms involved in producing articles about peo-
ple in poverty. The content and tone of newspaper articles are determined by a complex set of
interactions among journalists, editors, newspaper proprietors, and the perceived or actual re-
sponse of readers; these are processes our results do not address (Gamson et al., 1992; Golding
and Middleton, 1982; Herman and Chomsky, 1994).
An additional reason for caution is that our theory does not fully account for those periods
when the relationship between unemployment and stigmatising rhetoric weakens. When un-
employment is already very high (e.g., 1930s and 1980s) then further increases in joblessness
do not necessarily lead to more stigmatising language. One possible explanation is that struc-
tural understandings of poverty may become more plausible in periods when unemployment
is exceptionally high and it becomes difficult to blame the moral failings of the unemployed. It
is also possible the economic situation of journalists might affect the content of their articles.
If journalists become at particular risk of losing their jobs during extremely deep recessions
they might become more sympathetic towards the poor.
Given these caveats, we argue future research should trace how processes of media produc-
tion affect the way people in poverty are presented. This work could deploy detailed discourse
analysis or archival research to unpick how actors such as proprietors or editors shape jour-
nalistic decisions about how to cover stories about poverty, and how they respond to changing
economic conditions (Baker, 2007).
HǂǌǍǈǋǒ, ƼǈǇǍƾǑǍ, ƺǇƽ ǂƽƾƺǍǂǈǇƺǅ ƾǆƻƾƽƽƾƽǇƾǌǌ
One insight we gain from our historical approach is the degree to which Malthusian explana-
tions of poverty have become ‘ideationally embedded’ in British politics and culture (Somers
and Block, 2005). The very fact that we observe a relatively stable association between ris-
ing unemployment and the frequency of stigmatising rhetoric is indicative of how particular
ideational regimes are redeployed to ‘construct, … explain, and normalise market processes’,
particularly inmoments of ‘crisis’ when the logic ofMalthusianismmight be dislodged by some
other ‘more compelling public narrative’ (Somers and Block, 2005: 264, 271). For example,
the experience of personal or family unemployment may lead individuals to support greater
redistribution if they are not countered by a narrative that blames the crisis on the immoral
behaviour of the poor. The ideational embeddedness of Malthusian ideas may help us explain
why people living in poverty are to deploy stigmatising language themselves: their interpreta-
tion of the social world is framed by, and draws on, the same set of narratives, symbols, and
discourses.
Our paper has broader theoretical relevance beyond poverty stigma because it provides an
account of the conditions under which deeply embedded cultural understandings are differ-
entially activated when they resonate with the structural context. This theoretical apparatus,
when combinedwith our long historical focusmight prove useful for understanding the resur-
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gence of anti-immigrant sentiment and nationalism in the press, and how these trends may
reflect longer processes connected with imperialism, decolonisation, andmass immigration to
the UK (Bonikowski, 2017).
LǂǆǂǍƺǍǂǈǇǌ
Error in our measure of stigmatising rhetoric is a limitation of our analysis. There will be
occasions when we count the usage of a word as ‘stigmatising’ even though it is being used
in another context; this issue is exacerbated by the way that the language used to talk about
poverty changes over time. However, our content analysis suggested that measurement error
predominantly occurred in years where model fit was poor, implying that error in our mea-
sure of stigmatising language likely undermines our ability to observe a relationship between
economic conditions and stigmatising rhetoric. Another concern is the generalisability of our
results, which are limited because the archive used in our analysis only provides access to a set
of centrist and right-wing publications. We cannot draw any conclusions about how left-wing
papers respond to rising unemployment. We are also unable to address the extent to which
journalists are responding to the attitudes of their readers. While we cannot rule out this pos-
sibility entirely, it is unlikely during the first three quarters of the twentieth century because
newspapers did not have access to regular and consistent polling data on the attitudes of their
readers towards welfare recipients (Hudson et al., 2016). This may change in the future as such
data has now become far more readily available.
CǈǇƼǅǎǌǂǈǇ
The rise in stigmatising media rhetoric about the poor following the Great Recession was con-
sistent with a pattern we observe across the twentieth century: as unemployment increases so
does newspaper stigmatisation of the poor. Although our data ends during the earliest years
of New Labour, there is little reason to expect that much has changed since then. The Blair
government presented itself as no soft touch on welfare, a trend that was only amplified by
the Conservative-led coalition. The Cameron government attacked ‘scroungers’ and ‘skivers’,
language that was also picked up by newspapers ( Jensen and Tyler, 2015). The phenomenon of
‘poverty porn’ too is symptomatic of the ideational embeddedness ofMalthusian ideas, reveal-
ing howproducers, viewers, and, to some extent, subjects of these ‘documentaries’ draw on and
reproduce these narratives ( Jensen, 2014). These ideas are deeply rooted in the British cultural
imagination and so such language will return in the future, likely in a different form, but with
the same purpose of ‘holding dependent poverty disgraceful’ (Malthus, 2008: III.VI.5). Though
the specificwords usedmight vary, the rhetoric of recessions among centre-right British news-
papers is unlikely to change in the near future.
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ Ȣ: CǂǋƼǎǅƺǍǂǈǇ ƿǂǀǎǋƾǌ, ǉǈǅǂǍǂƼƺǅ ǅƾƺǇǂǇǀ, ǋƾƺƽƾǋǌǁǂǉ
ƽƾǆǈǀǋƺǉǁǂƼǌ, ƺǇƽ ǈǐǇƾǋǌǁǂǉ ƽƾǍƺǂǅǌ ǈƿ ǌƾǅƾƼǍƾƽ Ǉƾǐǌǉƺǉƾǋǌ
This appendix provides additional detail about our sample of newspapers. Most of the data
presented here is not available for the Economist as it is usually classed as a weekly news mag-
azine rather than a newspaper (though it self-describes as a newspaper). In terms of readership
demographics and political leanings it is likely to be similar to the Financial Times.
Political leanings
Our sample of papers are predominantly centrist or right-wing in orientation. The Daily Mail
andDaily Telegraph have both been staunchly conservative since their founding (Temple, 2008:
34–9), and have backed the British Conservative Party at every election from 1945 onwards
(Butler and Butler, 2000: 536). The Times also usually endorses the Conservative Party, while
the Economist and Financial Times tend more towards classical liberal concerns about free
trade and markets.
Circulation
Table 1a displays circulation information for the daily (rather than Sunday) editions of theMail,
Telegraph, Times, and Financial Times. In terms of circulation, the Daily Mail and Telegraph
reach a mass market, with circulations of over 1 million a day for much of the 20th century,
as table 1a illustrates. The Times and Financial Times perhaps make up for their smaller cir-
culations by their reputation for reaching and influencing political and economic elites. Ex-
cluding the Economist, our sample of papers consistently reach about 3-4 million readers in
the post-war period, which comprises about a quarter of the total circulation of national daily
newspapers, and between one quarter and half of all papers published consistently across the
20th century.
Table 1a: circulation for our sample of newspapers
Circulation in 000s
Year DailyMail
Daily
Telegraph Times
Financial
Times Total
% of total
circulation
% circulation of
consistently
published
1910 900 230 45 1175 27% 52%
1930 1986 222 187 2395 27% 41%
1939 1510 640 213 2363 22% 29%
1951 2245 976 254 57 3532 21% 24%
1960 2084 1155 255 122 3616 22% 26%
1965 2464 1351 258 146 4219 27% 29%
1970 1917 1402 402 170 3891 33% 35%
1980 1985 1456 316 196 3953 26% 28%
1990 1708 1076 420 290 3494 25% 28%
1998 2343 1062 760 4165 33% 35%
Notes: all circulation figures in 000s. Figures originate from a variety of sources collected in Butler and Butler
(2000: 536–8) except Financial Times (Seymour-Ure, 2000: 28–9). No data is available for the Financial
Times prior to 1951 because it was not regarded as a national newspaper due to its’ narrow focus on finance.
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Readership Demographics
Newspaper readership is closely associated with occupational status (Chan and Goldthorpe,
2007). The Telegraph, Financial Times, and Times, all belong to the so-called ‘broadsheet’ or
‘quality’ press aimed at high status professional and managerial classes, while the Daily Mail is
usually seen as a ‘mid-market tabloid’ appealing to a lower-middle class/ intermediate status
audience. Table 1b confirms these conclusions, for the post-war era at least – 40-50% of the
readership of the Telegraph, Financial Times, and Times come from the professional andman-
agerial classes, and fewer than 10% (except for the Times in 1966) from the semi and unskilled
manual classes. By contrast, the Daily Mail draws a similar proportion of readers from these
two classes. Thus our sample of newspapers is read generally by relatively advantaged groups,
with the exception of the Mail, which has always tended to have a broader appeal (Temple,
2008: 28–9).
Table 1b: Percentage of newspaper readership in NRS Social Grade
AB – professional, administrative, and managerial, DE – semi and
unskilled manual.
1966 1993-4
AB DE difference AB DE difference
Daily Mail 19 27 -8 30 16 14
Daily Telegraph 42 8 34 55 7 48
Financial Times 56 3 53 61 4 57
Times 54 15 39 60 7 53
Notes: data from the National Readership Survey, tabulated in
Seymour-Ure (2000: 144–5)
Ownership
Media theorists often regard newspaper proprietors as having a major influence on the output
and tone of newspapers. The Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, and Times (including Sunday edi-
tions) are owned by privately owned companies on behalf of wealthy proprietors ‘press barons’
(for example Rupert Murdoch’s News International have owned the Times since 1981). This
ownership model has persisted since the founding of all three papers, with fairly few changes
of ownership, the Daily Mail in particular is still owned by descendants of Viscount Rother-
mere, one of the paper’s founders in 1896. In all of these cases proprietors are likely to have
had substantial effects on content (see Temple, 2008: 34–9 for the case of the Daily Mail). By
contrast, the Financial Times was owned by Pearson, a publicly listed media and publishing
company from 1957 to 2015 (Butler and Butler, 2000; Seymour-Ure, 2000). The Economist
has been owned since its’ founding by the Economist Newspaper Limited, with 50% of its’
shares owned by Financial News Ltd since 1928.
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ Ѱ: DƾǌƼǋǂǉǍǂǏƾ ǌǍƺǍǂǌǍǂƼǌ ƿǈǋ ƽƾǉƾǇƽƾǇǍ, ǂǇƽƾǉƾǇ-
ƽƾǇǍ, ƺǇƽ ƼǈǇǍǋǈǅ Ǐƺǋǂƺƻǅƾǌ
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Logged negative rhetoric 4.67 .386 3.57 5.43 105
Logged unemployment rate 1.11 1.07 -2.23 2.73 105
Logged number of articles 12.5 .390 11.7 13.3 105
Logged placebo words 8.56 .419 7.72 9.46 105
Defence spending as % of GDP 8.98 12.0 2.43 52.0 105
Public debt 93.1 61.3 25.2 237.9 105
Tax revenue as % of GDP 29.3 10.4 10.0 43.5 101
Government non-defence spending as % of GDP 26.1 9.70 9.51 42.8 105
Political party in government
Conservative .485 .502 0 1 105
Labour .219 .416 0 1 105
Coalition .200 .402 0 1 105
Liberal .095 .295 0 1 105
Notes: Logged negative rhetoric and logged numbers of articles use data from Gale Newsvault (authors’
calculations). Public debt, tax revenue as a proportion of GDP, government spending as % proportion
of GDP from (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2016). Means of categorical variables can be interpreted as
proportion of total cases falling into specific category.
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ ѱ: AƽƽǋƾǌǌǂǇǀ ƺǎǍǈƼǈǋǋƾǅƺǍǂǈǇ
Table 3a compares an OLS regression model to three models which adjust for autocorrela-
tion in slightly different ways. Model 1 is estimated using OLS. The residuals from this model
are negatively autocorrelated with two lags. Model 2 is a Prais-Winsten regression model,
which assumes that the autocorrelation follows an AR(1) process. Model 3 is an OLS model
with Newey-West standard errors adjusted for serial correlation up to a second lag. Model
4 directly models the autocorrelation process by including 2 lags of the dependent variable,
logged change in unemployment, and logged change in the number of articles as predictors.
This model was selected by examining a number of autoregressive models with different lag
lengths, finding that an AR(2) model minimises the Bayesian Information Criterion (a com-
monly used tool for selecting lag length- see table 3b below). This model has residuals that
exhibit no significant autocorrelation.
Comparing all four models it can be seen that the standard error of the estimate of logged
change in unemployment on logged change in negative rhetoric is very similar across all four
models (from 0.019 in the Newey model to 0.023 in the OLS model), and statistically signif-
icant. Thus, our central result appears to be robust to a variety of different strategies for ad-
justing for autocorrelation. The majority of models presented in the main article adjust for
autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation up to a lag of
two and heteroscedasticity.
Table 3a: Robustness of association between unemployment and negative rhetoric to
adjustment for autocorrelation.
Annual change in the average frequency
of negative words
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS Prais Newey AR(2)
Increase in the unemployment 0.058* 0.063** 0.058** 0.065**
rate (log) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021)
Increase in the total number of 0.77*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.85***
published articles (log) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.091)
Constant -0.0069 -0.0072 -0.0069 -0.0074
(0.011) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0074)
AR(1) -0.33**
(0.097)
AR(2) -0.23*
(0.091)
Observations 105 105 105 105
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Prais-Winsten
regression models assume that the autocorrelation follows an AR(1) process. Newey model
contains standard errors that are adjusted for serial correlation up to the second lag and
heteroscedasticity. Autoregressive model contains two lags of the dependent variable,
and two lags of both independent variables.
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Table 3b: Bayesian Information Criterion from ARIMAmodels with various lag lengths
Lag length Bayesian Information Criterion
0 -145.8
1 -148.4
2 -149.1
3 -146.9
4 -142.3
5 -139.8
6 -135.7
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ Ѳ: RǈƻǎǌǍǇƾǌǌ ǈƿ ǋƾǅƺǍǂǈǇǌǁǂǉ ƻƾǍǐƾƾǇ ǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒ-
ǆƾǇǍ ƺǇƽ ǇƾǀƺǍǂǏƾ ǋǁƾǍǈǋǂƼ Ǎǈ ƺǅǍƾǋǇƺǍƾ ƼǈǇǍǋǈǅǌ ƿǈǋ ǐƺǋ ƺǇƽ
ƽƾƿƾǇƼƾ ǌǉƾǇƽǂǇǀ ƺǇƽ ǀƾǇƾǋƺǅ ƾǅƾƼǍǂǈǇǌ
Table 4a displays regression models with alternative controls for wartime. Model 1 uses de-
fence spending as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for war-time. Model 2 codes the first and
second world wars separately and model 3 includes additional wars – the Boer War, Falklands
War, and the first Gulf War. Our estimate of the association between changes in logged unem-
ployment and logged negative rhetoric is very similar in magnitude to model 1 in table 2 in the
main text, and remains statistically significant.
Table 4a: regression models with controls for defence spending and alternative
specifications of war-time.
Annual change in the average frequency
of negative words
(1) (2) (3)
Increase in the unemployment rate (log) 0.042* 0.054** 0.056**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Increase in defence spending as a -0.0046***
% of GDP (0.0010)
Increase in the total number of 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.74***
published articles (log) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
No war (ref)
WW1 -0.024
(0.039)
WW2 -0.036
(0.039)
No war (ref)
Any war -0.022
(0.029)
Constant -0.0057 -0.0027 -0.0017
(0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0100)
Observations 105 105 105
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models
estimated using Newey-West standard errors which are adjusted for serial correlation up to the
second lag and heteroscedasticity. Data on defence spending as a percentage of GDP from
Mitchell (2007).
Table 4b displaysmodels with additional controls for the years in which general elections were
held. Model 1 is a basemodel and includes just unemployment rates and the number of articles
published in a given year. Model 2 adds elections as a dummy and then model 3 adds elections
as a change variable, capturing whether moving into an election year is correlated with stig-
matizing rhetoric. In both cases, there is no clear association.
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Table 4b: Regression models with controls for election years.
Annual change in the average frequency
of negative words
(1) (2) (3)
Increase in the unemployment rate (log) 0.058** 0.058** 0.058**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Increase in the total number of 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.76***
published articles (log) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Election year (=1) -0.033
(0.026)
Change in elections -0.0033
(0.016)
Constant -0.0069 0.00077 -0.0069
(0.0085) (0.011) (0.0086)
Observations 105 105 105
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models
estimated using Newey-West standard errors which are adjusted for serial correlation up to the
second lag and heteroscedasticity.
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ ѳ: Hǈǐ Ǎǁƾ ǋƾǅƺǍǂǈǇǌǁǂǉ ƻƾǍǐƾƾǇ ƼǁƺǇǀƾǌ ǂǇ ǎǇƾǆ-
ǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ ƺǇƽ ƼǁƺǇǀƾǌ ǂǇ ǌǍǂǀǆƺǍǂǌǂǇǀ ǋǁƾǍǈǋǂƼ ƽƾǉƾǇƽ ǈǇ ǌǍƺǋǍ-
ǂǇǀ ǅƾǏƾǅǌ ǈƿ ǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ
Table 5a below shows the regression model on which figure 2 in the main text was based. It
Builds on model 1 in table 2 by introducing an interaction between changes in the unemploy-
ment rate and starting levels of unemployment.
Table 5a: How the relationship between changes in unemployment and changes in
stigmatising rhetoric depend on starting levels of unemployment
Annual change in the average
frequency of negative words
(1)
Increase in the unemployment rate (log) 0.083**
(0.025)
Unemployment rate -0.0012
(0.0024)
Increase in the unemployment rate (log)× -0.0069*
Unemployment rate (0.0034)
Increase in the number of published articles (log) 0.75***
(0.13)
Constant 0.0012
(0.013)
Observations 105
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models
estimated using Newey-West standard errors which are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation up to the second lag. Descriptive statistics for all control variables
are given in Web Appendix 2.
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ 6: TǒǉǂƼƺǅ ƺǇƽ ƽƾǏǂƺǇǍ Ƽƺǌƾ ǌƾǅƾƼǍǂǈǇ
In thisweb appendixwe providemore details regarding the different components of the typical
and deviant case analysis. This analysis is based on the procedure developed by Seawright
(2016).
Step 1: Selecting typical and deviant cases
We selected 1901 and 1991 as our typical cases – these are years where there was a low residual
(the model fit well) and a rise in unemployment (see table 6a). In 1901 we selected the words
Pauper* (11% rise) and Loafer* (14% rise) while in 1991 we selected the words underclass (a
decline in this year but from very high levels unique to the 1990s) and vagrant* (11% rise). We
selected 1934 and 1980 as our deviant cases – these are years where there was a high residual
(the model fit poorly). In particular, we look at years where negative rhetoric appears to have
risen. In 1934 we selected Tramp* (33% rise) and unemployable (43% rise) while in 1980 we
selected beggar* (49% rise) and workshy (a small decline in this year but to its 4th highest value
concentrated in the 1980s).
Table 6a: Identifying typical and deviant cases
Year Percentage-point change inunemployment rate Residual Words selected
Typical
1901 0.76 -0.05 Pauper* and Loafer*
1991 2.1 -0.03 Vagrant* and Underclass
Deviant
1934 -2.21 0.25 Unemployable and Tramp
1980 1 0.26 Beggar* and Workshy
Step 2: Coding the articles
In each year, we read the first 100 randomly selected or, if there were fewer than 100 articles,
we read every article. We used a 4 category coding scheme which had been developed by both
authors. This tried to identify – as the results indicate – irrelevant uses of the keywords. When
the words were used in the context of poverty, the articles were coded according to whether
the article deployed this term in the context of the stigmatising assumptions that are often
associated with these pejorative descriptions of the poor.
Step 3: Checking intercoder reliability
After the main coding was completed, another author also coded 2 key words from two dif-
ferent years (‘underclass’ in 1991 and ‘tramp’ in 1934). The degree of intercoder agreement
was relatively high for ‘underclass’ (Kappa statistic = 0.567, z-score = 5.81) and very high for
‘tramp’ (Kappa statistic = 0.800, z-score = 8.20). While the coding was not perfectly matched,
there is a high degree of agreement between the two coders.
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Table 6b: Examples of usage coded in each category
Stigmatising/Negative Sympathetic/Positive Neutral Irrelevant
‘A family of paupers,
extending to three
generations, has cost
the ratepayers of the
Paddington Union a
sum of £3,000’
(Hereditary Pauperism,
Daily Mail, November
21, 1901)
‘A pathetic letter,
which throws a flood
of light on the terrible
monotony of life in a
workhouse’ (A day in a
Pauper’s Life, Daily
Mail, October 29,
1901)
‘Mr How is highly
educated, and spends
most of his time
travelling about the
country, mixing with
tramps and other
outcasts’ (A Pauper
Millionaire, Daily Mail,
October 9, 1901)
‘The man found dead
under a hedge… and
since buried in a
pauper’s grave, was
John Howard Bullheid’
(Solicitor’s Strange
Death, Daily Telegraph,
October 9, 1901)
‘Verminous tramps…
and loafers’ (Tramp
Plague in London,
November 8, 1901,
Daily Telegraph)
‘People sleeping rough
in indescribable
squalor’ (More aid to
vagrants as MPs voice
worries, The Times,
February 9, 1991)
‘An admiring crowd of
loafers’ (A derby
disappointment, Daily
Telegraph, June 6,
1901)
‘Author of “The
Chronic Loafer”’ (A
drone and a dreamer,
The Times, December
19, 1901)
‘Gangs of drunken
beggars… aggressive
vagrants’ (Menace of
the beggars who strike
fear in heart of
London, Daily Mail,
June 17, 1991)
‘An underclass is
formed by a physical
concentration of social
problems’ (The
Underclass is no
Illusion, Financial
Times, April 22, 1991)
‘His chosen descent
into the underworld of
the workless and
vagrant’ (Making it
seem virtuous to eat
bacon, Daily Telegraph,
October 19, 1991)
‘Jimmy finds a vagrant
who has moved in’ (TV
Listing for Casualty,
November 8, 1991)
‘A deeper revolt by an
underclass of teenagers
seemingly no longer
able to communicate
with society’ (Cooling
the Hotheads, Sunday
Telegraphy, September
8, 1991)
‘Described the men for
whom the appeal was
made as unemployable
on the general labour
market’ (Helping hand
for ex-servicemen,
Daily Telegraph,
October 13, 1934)
‘There is no common
culture of the
underclass’ (The stuff
of a thousand suburban
novels, Daily
Telegraphy, February
15, 1991)
‘Japan Airlines is
scrapping an in-flight
magazine which
referred to… a social
underclass’ (Touchy
Subject, Daily
Telegraph, November
8, 1991)
‘“Tramps”… are an
enemy of society’
(Crime in Scotland,
The Times, May 2,
1934)
‘Evangelism is like one
beggar telling another
where to find bread’
(Theologians united on
Christian message, The
Times, July 28, 1980)
‘We have never
suggested that all the
2m jobless were
workshy’ (Plight of the
unemployed, Financial
Times, September 12,
1980)
‘One of the troubles of
the tramp steamer’
(Liners’ Bid for
Freights ‘Filching from
Tramps’, Daily
Telegraph, December
1, 1934)
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‘The recession has
already been driving…
endemic crime,
prostitution, and
beggary’ (The
tinderbox, The
Economist, May 17,
1980)
‘It reflected a collection
of Tory myths about
social security, the
workshy, and the
unemployed’
(Unemployed ‘Being
Made Scapegoats for
Economic Ills’, Daily
Telegraph, April 1,
1980)
‘When beggars die,
there are no comets
seen’ (Let them die
with dignity, The
Times, April 29, 1980)
‘Beggar’s Bridge’
(Racing, Daily Mail,
July 4, 1980)
We have also reproduced 3 articles used in this analysis below.
Table 6c: Number of articles coded in each category for each word
Typical case (High unemployment – high negative rhetoric)
Year Word Negative Sympathetic Neutral Irrelevant Total
1901 Pauper* 74 24 29 3 130
% 56.9 18.5 22.3 2.3 100
1901 Loafer* 45 0 5 34 84
% 53.6 0.0 6.0 40.5 100
1991 Vagrant* 45 5 7 42 99
% 45.5 5.1 7.1 42.4 100
1991 Underclass 52 18 15 14 99
% 52.5 18.2 15.2 14.1 100
Deviant case (high negative rhetoric – low change in unemployment)
1934 Unemployable 10 5 6 9 30
% 33.3 16.7 20.0 30.0 100
1934 Tramp 17 1 14 67 99
% 17.2 1.0 14.1 67.7 100
1980 Beggar* 17 1 7 74 99
% 17.2 1.0 7.1 74.7 100
1980 Workshy 5 3 8 14 30
% 16.7 10.0 26.7 46.7 100
Notes: Workshy spikes because it was the name of a horse. Unemployable is used to refer to
blindness quite a bit and there was some concern about charity for these groups. Tramp
is highly irrelevant because there was a shipping crisis and one of the types of ships involved
was called a ‘tramp’. Beggar* is highly irrelevant because there was theatrical production
titled ‘The Beggar’s Opera’ and Lester Piggott rode a horse called Beggars Bush. These both
received a lot of coverage.
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